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v. B. & T. Lumber Company, 0 and this was resolved against the
plaintiff who was seeking to recover an amount allegedly loaned
to defendant, it appearing that the plaintiff had merely made
payments to defendant on a contract to purchase lumber.
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
Construction on River Bank
Article 455 of the Civil Code provides that the use of the
banks of navigable rivers is public, and the courts have enjoined
owners from putting up constructions on such property." At the
same time, the codifiers recognized the probability of structures
actually being placed on the river bank because they included two
articles for the purpose of dealing with these situations. Article
8612 provides for the removal of the construction if it "obstructs
or embarrasses" the use of the river bank; Article 8623 permits
the construction to remain if it "merely encroach upon the public
way" and if its removal would cause signal damage to the
owner. The choice between the prohibitive and the permissive
rules is frequently and necessarily left to the court. In the case
of Town of Madisonville v. Dendinger4 the court applied the per-
missive rule of Article 862 so as to leave a private warehouse
which was located on the riparian property and extended across
the river bank. In the present state of the jurisprudence, it is
10. 214 La. 1016, 39 So.(2d) 598 (1949).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Town of Napoleonville v. Boudreaux, 142 So. 874 (La. App. 1932). For
fuller discussion, see Note (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 542. Cf. Pizanie v.
Gauthreaux, 173 La. 737, 138 So. 650 (1931).
2. Art. 861, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Works which have been formerly built
on public places, or in the beds of rivers or navigable streams, or on their
banks, and which obstruct or embarrass the use of these places, rivers,
streams, or their banks, may be destroyed at the expense of those who claim
them, at the instance of the corporation of the place, or of any individual of
full age residing in the place where they are situated.
"And the owner of these works can not prevent their being destroyed
under pretext of any prescription or possession, even immemorial, which he
may have had of it, if it be proved that at the time these works were con-
structed, the soil on which they are built was public, and has not ceased to be
so since."
3. Art. 862, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the works, formerly constructed on
the public soil, consist of houses or other buildings, which can not be de-
stroyed, without causing signal damage to the owner of them, and if these
houses or other buildings merely encroach upon the public way, without pre-
venting its use, they shall be permitted to remain, but the owner shall be
bound, when he rebuilds them, to relinquish that part of the soil or of the
public way, upon which they formerly stood."
4. 214 La. 593, 38 So.(2d) 252 (1948). See fuller discussion in Note (1949)
9 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 542.
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difficult to say which constructions "obstruct" and which "merely
embarrass"; and when more decisions will have been rendered,
there will be a broader basis on which to develop a pattern of
permitted and prohibited constructions on the banks of rivers.
Timber Contracts
Since Act 188 of 1904,5 the sale of timber has created a sepa-
rate estate distinct from the land, and the courts in turn have
formulated the answers to the new questions which arose. Thus,
unless otherwise specified, timber means merchantable timber,
and the time for its removal must be reasonable; the court de-
termines what is merchantable and has fixed the point of refer-
ence as the date of the contract." Questions of interpretation of
new timber contracts frequently have to come to the court for
settlement. Thus, in Stanga v. Lake Superior Piling Company7 the
court had occasion to add a new point by indicating that a judg-
ment should fix the time for removal to a certain period after
the finality of the judgment because in the present case the cal-
endar date fixed by the lower court had expired during the pend-
ency of the suspensive appeal.
Another variation of the time problem in timber contracts
was established in the two companion cases of Greene v. Wil-
liams and Greene v. McQueen.8 The contract specified 48 work-
ing months for the removal of the timber, and the court declared
that the timber rights had already been fully exercised and were
terminated because 91/4 years had elapsed with approximately
7 working months per year. The court dismissed the contention
that another contract provision granting rights of way for 20 years
kept the timber rights alive, because this right of way included
passage for the removal of timber from neighboring lands as
well as from the immediate tract in question.
Revocation of Dedication
The statutory dedication of a street to the public vests full
ownership in the municipality or parish.9 If the street is aban-
5. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6548.
6. Brown v. Hodge-Hunt Lbr. Co., 162 La. 635, 110 So. 886 (1926); Clark v.
Weaver Bros. Realty Corp., 197 La. 63, 200 So. 821 (1941).
7. 214 La. 237, 36 So.(2d) 778 (1948).
8. 214 La. 552, 38 So.(2d) 229 (1948).
9. La. Act 134 of 1896 (repealed by La. Act 51 of 1930 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 5347]); Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So.
229 (1938). Distinguish the establishment of a mere servitude by tacit dedica-
tion. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 3368, as amended by La. Act 220 of 1914 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 3634); Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp., 205 La. 988, 18 So.(2d) 591
(1944); Bomar v. City of Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926).
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doned or not necessary for public purposes, Act 382 of 1938 pro-
vides that the dedication may. be revoked, whereupon "all of the
soil covered by and embraced in such roads, streets or alleyways
up to the center line thereof, shall revert to the then present
owner or owners of the land contiguous thereto." This constitutes
a new conveyance, as distinguished from the termination of a
servitude of right of way. In the case of Martin v. Fuller'0 the
dedication of an alleyway was revoked by the City of Monroe and
the dispute arose over the ownership of the land. Prior to the
revocation, the original owner gave an option to plaintiff to pur-
chase the lots on both sides of the alleyway, describing the lots
but making no mention of the alleyway. After the revocation, and
its recordation, the original owner conveyed certain property to
defendant by a deed which included specific description of the
alleyway land. When plaintiff exercised his option and recorded
his deed, he claimed ownership of the alleyway strip. Both sides
of the argument are well outlined in the majority and dissenting
opinions but the decision favored the plaintiff. The majority inter-
preted the statute "reverts to the then present owner" of the
contiguous land as meaning reverts to the property from which it
was carved out by the dedication.
A situation which somewhat resembles this one is the sale of
a riparian property by a deed which describes the front line at
the river road, but in that case the court held that the original
owner remained owner of the land or the bank on the river side
of the road so as to become owner of any accretion by alluvion. 1
There is a clear distinction however as to the original owner of
the alleyway because the statutory dedication of that land com-
pletely divested him of any proprietary interest, and the 1938
statute permitting the revocation could only have intended the
incorporation of this land, up to its center, with the adjacent
properties.
The dissenting opinion adheres to the letter of the statute in
insisting upon the revesting of the land in the original owner
whose option covering the adjacent lots had not yet been taken
up. However, the intent of the statute, in combination with the
state's registry laws, supports the majority view.
Occupancy-after abandonment
One of the modes of acquiring ownership is by occupancy, 12
10. 214 La. 204, 37 So.(2d) 851 (1948), noted in (1949) 23 Tulane L. Rev. 402.
11. Maginnis v. Marcello, 168 La. 997, 123 So. 653 (1929).
12. Art. 3412 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
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but this is limited to things which at the time have no owner,
res nullius. A thing which is susceptible of ownership may hap-
pen to be without an owner either by reason of the fact that it
has not yet had any owner (wild life and game), or because its
former owner has abandoned it.'5 In the latter situation, a claim
of occupancy must be predicated on a preliminary proof of aban-
donment, which is not a matter to be taken lightly. Thus in Don-
nell v. Gray14 a landowner was denied the ownership of certain
oil well equipment merely because it had been left on his proper-
ty for a considerable time after operations were finished. The
owner's silence and failure to remove the equipment after a
notice to vacate do not constitute an abandonment. In fact, the
original owner could not have had any intention of giving it up
because he later sold the equipment to the plaintiff in the present
suit who was trying to get it from the resisting defendant. Judg-




For the ten-year acquisitive prescription in good faith and
with just title, the Civil Code provides that the entry on a part
of the estate establishes possession of the whole property as de-
scribed in the deed.' Where the property involved is one single
tract of land, properly described, the application of this princi-
ple is clear and simple. In the case of Haas v. Dezauche2 the facts
presented a variation of the problem, because in the one deed
there were included several separate tracts of land which were
contiguous but individually described. Entry had been satisfac-
torily established' on part but not all of this land; there was no
showing of actual possession over the area in dispute. The court
sustained the acquisitive prescription for the whole property on
the ground that, despite the separate descriptions of the respec-
13. Art. 3421, La. Civil Code of 1870.
14. 41 So.(2d) 66 (La. 1949).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art 3437, La. Civil Code of 1870: "It is not necessary, however, that a
person wishing to take possession of an estate should pass over every part
of it; it is sufficient if he enters on and occupies a part of the land, provided it
be with the intention of possessing all that is included within the boundaries."
2. 214 La. 259, 37 So.(2d) 441 (1948).
3. This possession was shown by the cutting and removing timber from
swamp lands, on the authority of Veltin v. Haas, 207 La. 650, 21 So.(2d) 862
(1945). See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1944-1945 Term
(1946) 6 LOUiSuANA LAW R VIsw 521, 580.
